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1 Introduction
Many real-life optimization problems involve multiple entities, or agents (individ-
uals, companies...), with their own private constraints and preferences, communi-
cating with each other in order to find a solution that maximizes the overall public
satisfaction. In Artificial Intelligence, the field of Distributed Constraint Opti-
mization (DCOP) has been addressing such multi-agent optimization problems,
through distributed message-passing algorithms such as the DPOP algorithm [5].
However, the research in DCOP has been neglecting the privacy of the infor-
mation exchanged by the agents during the computing of the solution, which is
critical to many real-life problems. While agents are willing to cooperate with each
other to produce an optimal solution, they are most often reluctant to reveal their
private constraints and preferences to other, which hinders this cooperation.
The goal of this project was to implement, test, and evaluate a secured ver-
sion of DPOP, P-DPOP [3]. P-DPOP provides strong agent privacy and topology
privacy by randomization, constraints privacy and limited decision privacy by ob-
fuscation. The algorithm was implemented in Java, as part of the open-source
FRODO platform for DCOP [4].
2 Project Overview
2.1 DPOP
The DPOP algorithm [5] leaks privacy information in its three phases. First, in
the DFS construction phase, the identity of the root is revealed to every agent as
well as some information about the topology of the constraint graph.
Second, in the UTIL propagation phase, all the costs passed in the messages
are in clear text. Some information is semiprivate, for example an agent learns
what values are feasible for its own variables under different circumstances. How-
ever, agents learn the identity of all their ancestors even with whom they are not
connected.
Third, in the VALUE propagation phase, assignments circulate through the
graph in clear text. All agents receive the final assignments, even for variables of
other agents with whom they do not have constraints.
2.2 P-DPOP
The P-DPOP algorithm [3] is a secured version of DPOP that provides guarantees
on what private information can or cannot be leaked to others agents. First in
the DFS construction, P-DPOP uses random integers to obfuscate variable IDs to
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Algorithm 1: P-DPOP: DPOP with privacy guarantees (taken from [3]).
P-DPOP(A,X ,D, C)
Initialization:
For each binary constraint c(x, y) ∈ C, agent a(x) generates a vector of1
random obfuscating keys O(x) that it sends to agent a(y), which does
likewise
For each variable xi ∈ X , agent a(xi) generates a codename C(xi), and2
codenames C(v1), . . . , C(vk) for xi’s domain values, and sends them to all
agents owning a variable linked to xi by a constraint
Anonymous DFS construction:
Choose root of DFS tree using Algorithm 23
Construct DFS labeling4
UTIL propagation:
Wait for UTIL messages from all children5
Partially deobfuscate received UTIL messages using known keys and6
codenames
As in DPOP, join resulting messages with own unary constraints and binary7
constraints involving (pseudo-)parents’ variables; project xi out
Obfuscate result and send to parent8
VALUE propagation:
Wait for VALUE message from parent; deobfuscate it9
Compute optimal value v∗i for xi10
Send VALUE messages to all children using the codenames C(xi) and C(v
∗
i )11
determine the root of DFS tree. In the UTIL and VALUE propagation, all variable
names and domains are also obfuscated by random codenames. Furthermore, all
utilities transmitted are hidden by adding large random numbers. See Algorithm 1.
2.3 Project Management
For this project, spiral management was used. It is an iterative approach of system
development. The term spiral is used to describe the process that is illustrated
in Figure 1. The mechanisms go back several times to earlier sequences, over and
over again, circulating like a spiral.
At the end of every spiral, we obtain a complete product. The next spiral in-
creases the functionalities of the previous spiral with additional work. Accordingly
the report is also written for every spiral release, when all specificities and impor-
tant points are still fresh in mind. Product and report quality are also improved
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Figure 1: The spiral development process [2]
at every spiral. This is a plus compared to traditional waterfall management. An-
other improvement in spiral management is a better control of time. If the final
deadline for the project is shortened for any reason, the product of the previous
spiral can be turned in. But as a time inconvenient, spiral management can iterate
much longer than waterfall management.
This project was managed in three spirals:
1. The DFS construction;
2. Agent, topology and decision privacy in both UTIL propagation and the
VALUE propagation phase;
3. The third spiral should have focused on constrain privacy in UTIL propaga-
tion, but could not be completed in time.
For all the implemented code of this project, Junit tests are provided to ensure
correctness. They give a reliability of the implemented code and an insurance
that the algorithm functions as envisaged. It also helps debug and permits to find
unexpected bugs.
2.3.1 Spiral 1: Secure Variable Election
This spiral focused on the implementation of the secured variable election module
on top of the existent FRODO variable election module, and the evaluation of the
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Figure 2: DFS tree
impact of this heuristic compared to the best known DPOP heuristic (the most
connected heuristic).
2.3.2 Spiral 2: Agent, Topology and Decision Privacy
This spiral put the emphasis on the implementation of a new module for variable
obfuscation and the evaluation of the impact of this module with and without
“mergeback” (see Section 4.1) compared to DPOP.
3 Secure Variable Election
DPOP has two major privacy problems in its variable election module: first it leaks
out the maximum variable ID, i.e. all agents learn which is the elected variable.
For instance in Figure 2: A is elected root. The DPOP algorithm indicates to C
that A is the root and even worse, DPOP reveals A’s ID, which, in the case of
the most connected heuristic, contains A’s number of neighbors. But C should not
learn about A’s existence.
Second, DPOP leaks out topology privacy. Agents know automatically the
direction and the distance (in number of edges in the constraint graph) between
them and the elected variable. Because the maximum ID is propagated step by
step through the graph, this implies that variables that received the maximum ID
at step 5 learn that they are at distance 5 of the root. The direction from where
the maximum ID came also indicates automatically the direction where the root
is located.
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Algorithm 2: Anonymous leader election (taken from [3]).
1: elect leader(a)
2: Generate unique obfuscated identifying number ID
3: max← rand(0 . . . ID)
4: nb lies← rand(n . . . 2n)
5: for nb lies times do
6: Send max to all neighbors
7: Get max1 . . .maxk from all neighbors
8: max tmp←max(max,max1, . . . ,maxk)
9: max← rand(max tmp . . .max(ID,max tmp))
10: max←max(max, ID)
11: for (3n− nb lies) times do
12: Send max to all neighbors
13: Get max1 . . .maxk from all neighbors
14: max←max(max,max1, . . . ,maxk)
15: if max = ID then
16: Choose any of the agent’s variables xr and mark it as the root of the DFS
tree
To avoid these privacy problems, two features are implemented in P-DPOP.
The leader election module follows Algorithm 2: every variable obfuscates itself
using a large random ID number. In this manner, all variables will learn the
maximum ID, but they cannot link this ID number back to the corresponding
variable.
The second feature is, in the transmission phase, allowing variables to lie. Lying
consists in transmitting a value for the maximum ID that is sub-evaluated. Agents
will lie a random number of times, between N and 2N, where N is an upper bound
on the diameter of the constraint graph. Therefore, topology cannot be inferred
because the maximum ID will propagate randomly and un-uniformly slower.
3.1 Implemented Features
The secure and insecure variable election modules are very similar. They elect
the root with the same communication protocol based on viral propagation. The
lack of privacy is not really in this protocol itself, which is why the secure module
sub-classes the previous insecure module. They differ in the manner they generate
and propagate IDs. The secure module uses generated random numbers and can
sub-evaluate the maximum ID it transmits. Because of this sub-evaluation, the
secured module uses three times more steps to elect the root.
Following FRODO’s modular implementation, the secure variable election mod-
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ule can also be used in the DPOP algorithm. This feature is used to demonstrate
the isolated impact of secure DFS heuristics in Section 5.1.
Also, Algorithm 2 proposes to generate only positive random numbers. In our
implementation, the span of random numbers generated by the secure module is
between −231 and 231 − 1. A larger range allows higher privacy and avoids ID
collisions.
4 Variable Obfuscation
During DPOP’s UTIL and VALUE propagation phases, variable names and do-
mains are transmitted in clear text. Variable Obfuscation solves this issue. First
all variables generate randomly a codename and random numbers for their do-
mains. All codenames must be unique to avoid errors during the computation.
Codenames are generated as the hexadecimal representation of a random 32-bit
number, in a way to propose a large span of possible codenames with the shortest
string as possible for lowering the cost of transmission.
In a second phase, all variables send their codenames and obfuscated domains
to their children and pseudo-children. When a variable then sends a UTIL or
a VALUE message, the Variable Obfuscation module catches the message and
encodes the variables and values contained in the message. At reception of a UTIL
or VALUE message, the module also catches it and decodes all known codenames
and values. This way, a variable has access only to information on the variables it
has constrains with.
4.1 Implemented Features
This module can be used in two manners: with or without “mergeback”, which
corresponds to whether or not variables are capable of decoding and merging back
edges. All codenames contained in a UTIL message represent a constraint edge
in the graph. When two constraints (two back edges, or one tree edge and one
back edge) refer to the same variable, these edges can be merged into only one,
reducing the size of the UTIL message.
With “mergeback”, all variables generate one unique codename that they trans-
mit to every (pseudo-)child. This allows children that received a message that
contains the codename for one of these (pseudo-)parents to decode it and to send
only one codename for this (pseudo-)parent instead of multiple.
Without “mergeback”, all variables generate as many unique codenames as
they have (pseudo-)children. Then they send to each a different codename. A
child will not be able to recognize his (pseudo-)parent’s codename in a received
8
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Figure 4: CodeNames sent
without “mergeBack”
message. And when this child sends in turn a message, it will potentially contain
multiple different codenames for the same variable.
Let us consider the graph in Figures 3 and 4, where codenames Cx, C
′
x refer
to X and Cy to Y . In the UTIL propagation phase, Z will send a message to Y
that contains Cy and Cx. If “mergeback” is activated, Y will recognize Cx and
therefore will send in its UTIL message to X only Cx. But if “mergeback” is not
activated, Y will not be able to decode Cx because it received from X a different
codename C ′x. Therefore Y will send to X a UTIL message that contains both Cx
and C ′x.
In Algorithm 1, codenames and domain values of a variable are sent to all
agents owning a neighboring variable. In our implementation however, only the
agents who own a child or a pseudo-child of this variable receive this information,
which reduces the number of messages exchanged.
5 Experimental Results
All experiments have been run on a Dell Precision M4300, Intel Core 2 Duo CPU
2.4GHz, on Windows XP, Eclipse 3.4.1 with 1024 Mbytes of JVM memory. For all
experimental results, graphics represent the median with 95% confidence interval
over 300 experiments.
The confidence intervals for the median are computed as follows: after the run
of all 300 experiments, all results are sorted to find the median. Then confidence
intervals are inferred as shown in Figure 5, with median in red and confidence
interval in blue. For the formulae to be correct, the number of considered problems
n must be at least 71. In experimental results, if a confidence interval is not present,
this means that the interval is of length 0.
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Figure 5: Represented median and confidence interval
5.1 Effects of Secure DFS Heuristics on Induced Width
The secured random integer heuristic does not allow the utilization of the best
known heuristic, which is the most connected heuristic. Therefore, the DFS trees
generated will have higher induced widths. This implies a bigger maximum number
of variables in UTIL messages, which is an important factor of complexity.
The results from Figures 6, 8 and 9 were obtained for random graphs with 15
variables, 10 agents, and from 25 to 55 constraints. The time measurement of the
leader election module alone is not constrained by the allocated memory, unlike for
the full algorithm, so we were able to perform tests on graphs with more variation
in connectivity, from low connectivity to complete graphs. The results in Figure 7
are obtained for random graphs with 25 variables, 15 agents, and from 10 to the
maximum 300 constraints, using the simulated time metric [7].
Figure 6 shows the median induced width over 300 runs, with 95% confidence
intervals (whose widths vary between 0 and 1). It also shows a linear increase
in induced width. In general, the secure heuristic generates two more variables
in its biggest UTIL message than the most connected heuristic. For problems
with domain size 3, these two additional variables multiply by 9 (32) the memory
requirements.
The simulated time metric has a granularity that depends on the underlying
operating system and may be of 10 milliseconds [1]. This explains the zero results
for low connectivity problems and the plateaus in Figure 7. The computational
time of the secured heuristic grows clearly faster than the insecure leader election.
Figure 8 demonstrates that information exchanged by the secure leader election
phase is about 2.5 times bigger than the insecure. This is a small difference
compared to the exponential factor induced in the UTIL propagation, as shown in
Figure 9.
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Figure 6: Effect of secured leader election on DFS width
Figure 7: Computational time of leader election
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Figure 8: Information exchanged by Leader election phase
Figure 9: Information exchanged by UTIL propagation phase
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Figure 10: Total information exchanged by complete algorithms
5.2 Effects of Secured UTIL and VALUE Propagation
Effects appear in two factors: securing these phases produces more messages that
DPOP’s insecure approach because it requires initially transmitting messages con-
taining the codenames to be used. Without “mergeback”, the number of variables
contained in a UTIL message will also increase by a factor that depends on the
connectivity of the graph.
The following results were obtained for random graphs with 15 variables, 10
agents, and from 15 to 55 constraints. Results for P-DPOP without “mergeBack”
are computed only up to 25 constraints because it exceeded the maximum memory
allocated to compute a solution for higher numbers of constraints.
Figures 10 and 11 show that for low numbers of constraints, DPOP and P-
DPOP with “mergeback” perform sensibly the same. But it shows the rapid
exponential growth of the P-DPOP algorithm without “mergeback” compared
to the other algorithms. We also see that the cost of lying in secure variable
election and of exchanging codenames is very small compared to the cost of the
overall algorithms. The real cost of P-DPOP is in a wider DFS tree, which is
the bottleneck of the algorithms in the DPOP family. The computational time
difference is linear during the leader election as seen in section 5.1, but the poorness
of the DFS tree induces an exponential time difference in the overall algorithm.
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Figure 11: Computational time of complete algorithms
6 Conclusion
When a real-life distributed constraint satisfaction problem must be solved while
preserving privacy, DPOP might not fit the privacy requirement. By using secure
modules and non-deterministic features, the P-DPOP algorithm is able to grant
this privacy.
Secure heuristics clearly generate poorer DFS trees than the insecure, most
connected heuristic in terms of induced width. The difference might be thought
minimal, but DPOP has a complexity that is exponential in this induced width;
therefore secure heuristics incur a non negligible cost in memory and message
sizes. However, the P-DPOP algorithm seems to be able to scale reasonably well
compared to DPOP, on the random problems used in our experiments. On the
other hand, additionally requiring that variables be incapable of merging back-
edges (without “mergeback”) dramatically increases complexity, resulting in an
algorithm that very quickly runs out of memory. Privacy has for sure a cost!
Future work includes experiments using a more realistic problem class, as well
as implementing utility obfuscation (missing spiral three), which should have only
a limited impact on performance.
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